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Abstract 
Most analyses of social protection are focussed on public arrangements. However, social 
effort is not restricted to the public domain; all kinds of private arrangements can be 
substitutes to public programs. In fact, in several countries there has been a shift from public 
towards private social arrangements. OECD-data indicate that accounting for private social 
benefits has an equalising effect on levels of social effort across a number of countries. This 
suggests that public and private social expenditures are complementary to some extent. But 
their distributional effects differ. In all OECD countries, the social protection system causes a 
more equal distribution of incomes. Indeed, using cross-country data, we find a negative 
relationship between public social expenditures and income inequality and a positive 
relationship between public social expenditure and income redistribution. But we do not find 
a significant positive relationship between private social expenditures and income inequality 
or income redistribution. Consequently, changes in the public/private-mix in the provision of 
social protection may affect the redistributive impact of the welfare state. 
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1  Introduction 
 
The welfare state aims to reduce income inequality between individuals. People differ in their 
talent, socio-economic background and opportunities. The market process then results in large 
differences in income levels. Governments achieve interpersonal redistribution of market 
incomes through taxes and social benefits (cash benefits and benefits in kind). In recent years 
considerable progress has been made in empirical research on the impact of social protection 
systems on income inequality. But most analyses of social protection are focussed on public 
arrangements. However, social effort is not restricted to the public domain; all kinds of 
private arrangements can be substitutes to public programs. The OECD has done  
comprehensive studies on public and private social expenditure (Adema, 2001; Adema and 
Ladaique, 2005; Adema, Fron and Ladaigue, 2011). They define private programs as ‘social’ 
when they serve a social purpose, are subject to government intervention and contain an 
element of interpersonal redistribution. The data gathered by the OECD show that such 
private social arrangements have a substantial size in many countries. In fact, in several 
countries welfare state reforms have caused a shift from public towards private social 
expenditures. Our question is whether such a shift from public to private social arrangements 
affects the redistributive impact of the welfare state. Theoretically, it is plausible that public 
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and private arrangements in social protection systems have dissimilar distributional effects. In 
this paper, we will empirically investigate the relationship, if any, between cross-country 
differences in public and private social expenditure and the distribution of income in a number 
of wealthy nations. To that end, we will use more recent data on private social expenditure 
than in earlier work (Caminada and Goudswaard, 2005). We analyse the effects of accounting 
for private social benefits on social protection statistics, and link both public social spending and 
private social spending to indicators of income inequality and income redistribution. Our 
purpose is to present a simple and intuitive analysis which elaborates on previous work.1 The 
aim of the paper is not to explain the household income distribution across countries, nor will 
we discuss the direction of the causality of the relationship between cross-country differences in 
income inequality and the levels of social spending. Such an analysis should be based on a 
theory which would have to address several cross-national differences explaining the household 
income distribution (cf. Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997). Such a comprehensive approach is 
far beyond the scope of this paper. 
This contribution is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises empirical results of the level of 
income inequality and income redistribution through the welfare state across countries. In 
section 3 we discuss the nature of private social expenditures and show recent data on these 
expenditures. In section 4 we perform several empirical analyses on public and private social 
expenditures, and the distribution of income. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2  Empirical evidence on income inequality and income redistribution  
 
The best cross-nationally comparable collection of income data is the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS). LIS was created specifically to improve consistency across countries. The LIS 
data are a collection of micro data-sets obtained from a range of income surveys in various 
countries. The advantage of these data is that extensive efforts have been made by country 
specialists to make information on income and household characteristics as comparable as 
possible across a large number of countries. The approach adopted by LIS overcomes most, 
but not all, of the problems of making comparisons across countries that plagued earlier 
studies (Smeeding, 2002).  
This section summarises the evidence on cross national comparisons of income inequality 
over 28 nations based on empirical evidence from LIS (Wang and Caminada, 2011). Levels of 
inequality can be shown in several ways, e.g. by Lorenz curves, specific points on the 
percentile distribution (P10 or P90), decile ratios (P90/P10), and Gini coefficients or many 
other summary statistics of inequality. All (summary) statistics of inequality can be used to 
rank income inequality in OECD countries, but they do not always tell the same story. The 
obvious advantage of the presentation of inequality by summary statistics is its ability to 
summarise several nations in one picture. 
Figure 1 shows the most often used summary measure of the income distribution - the Gini 
coefficient of equivalized disposable income. The Gini coefficient lies between 0 (no 
inequality and 1 (maximum inequality). The figure indicates that a wide range of inequality 
of disposable income exists across developed nations, with the nation with the highest 
inequality coefficient (Mexico) over twice as high as the nation with the lowest coefficient 
(Denmark). In another study (Caminada and Goudswaard, 2001) we have shown that 
income inequality has risen since the early 1980’s in the majority of the OECD countries, 
although it is wrong to think in terms of a world-wide trend (Atkinson, 2000). 
                                                 
1  We include 28 countries in our data set on the basis of data availability on both income 
(re)distribution measures and public and private social expenditure measures: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estinia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  
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Figure 1: Gini index of equivalized disposable income  
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Source: Wang and Caminada (2011); data to be found at http://www.lisdatacenter.org/ 
 
But what is the impact of welfare states on inequality? Smeeding (2002) showed that social 
policies, wage distributions, time worked, social and labour market institutions and 
demographic differences all have some influence on why there are large differences in 
inequality among rich nations at any point in time. However, in this paper we focus on social 
protection systems only.  
Most nations have designed systems of social protection to shield their citizens against the 
risk of a fall in economic status due to unemployment, divorce, disability, retirement, and 
death of a spouse. But these social protection systems also aim to reduce inequality between 
individuals and households. The substantial differences in income inequality across welfare 
democracies are well documented (e.g. Förster, 2000; Atkinson et al, 1995; Gottschalk and 
Smeeding, 1997; Förster and d'Ercole 2005). These differences are often attributed to social 
policies. Förster’s empirical analyses showed that in most developed countries, between one 
third and 45 percent of all public transfers goes to the lower incomes. Korpi and Palme 
(1998), for example, showed that welfare states with generous social insurance programs 
redistribute economic resources more effectively and have a more equal distribution of 
incomes than welfare states with less generous insurance schemes. In general, tax/transfer 
systems as a whole reduce market-income inequality in all OECD countries.  
 
Usually the impact of social policy on the distributions of income is calculated in line with the 
work of Musgrave, Case and Leonard (1974), i.e. statutory or budget incidence analysis. That 
is, important issues of tax/transfer shifting and behavioural responses are ignored.2 The 
measure of the redistributive impact of social protection on inequality is straightforwardly 
based on formulas developed by Kakwani (1986) and Ringen (1991): 
  
Redistribution by government = (primary income – disposable income) / (primary income) x 100. 
                                                 
2 See for a critical survey of efforts to measure budget incidence by Smolensky et al. (1987). However, 
models that include e.g. behavioral links are beyond the scope of existing empirical work (Gottschalk 
and Smeeding, 1998: 3). Therefore, researchers have restricted themselves largely to accounting 
exercises which decompose changes in overall inequality into a set of components.  
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Figure 2 shows the reduction in inequality caused by social protection, where primary income 
inequality is given by a summary statistic of pre-tax, pre-transfer market incomes and 
disposable income inequality is given by the same summary statistic of disposable equivalent 
incomes. The figure shows the Gini income inequality before and after taxes/transfers and 
the inequality reduction coefficient in 28 countries around the year 2004. Taxes and transfers 
reduce the Gini by on average 35 percent. For example Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Sweden 
and Belgium achieve a greater redistribution of economic resources (more than 45 percent) 
compared to Mexico, Korea, United States and Israel (below 25 percent). It turns out that 
the latter countries are in fact those with the least equality (except Korea), while Denmark 
and Sweden are countries with a rather low degree of income inequality.  
 
Figure 2: Gini indices of market income and equivalized disposable income 
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Source: Wang and Caminada (2011); data to be found at http://www.lisdatacenter.org/ 
 
 
However, the results in figure 2 do not show the redistributive impact of separate parts of 
social protection systems. Recent literature suggests that the determination of the 
relationship between social expenditures and inequality should be carried out on a 
disaggregated basis (see Swabisch et al, 2003). Ferrarini and Nelson (2002) showed that only 
a limited number of studies have attempted to specify the link between specific social transfer 
programs and income inequality. Thereby, the knowledge about the institutional structures that 
produce certain distributive outcomes is limited. Especially earlier studies that decompose 
inequality into specific transfers do not pay sufficient attention to the problem of taxation of 
social insurance. To gain a deeper understanding of the redistributive mechanisms of the 
welfare state it is necessary to disaggregate the social transfer system into program specific 
components. Recent LIS data (Wang and Caminada, 2011) show a disaggregation for 
countries. Table 1 indicates that on average 15 percent of the redistributive impact of the 
welfare state can be attributed to taxes and 85 percent to transfers. However, the 
differences between countries are quite large: in the US 37 percent of redistribution comes 
from taxes, while in the partial effect of taxes is negative for Switzerland. The tax system in 
Switzerland is in fact regressive, which is caused by the offsetting effect of regressive payroll 
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tax (Kenworthy, 2009) and tax competition (Feld, 1999). In this country it appears to be 
difficult to levy redistributive taxes from the rich and mobile persons to the poor.  
At the program level, pensions have by far the strongest redistributive impact. More than 
half of the redistributive impact of social transfers comes from pensions. Unemployment 
programs do not contribute very substantially to income redistribution, while other programs 
(disability, health insurance, and social assistance) account on average for 34 percent of 
total redistribution in the countries presented in table 1.  
 
Table 1: Gini indices of private sector and disposable incomes and fiscal redistribution 
 
Country 
Gini 
private 
income 
Gini 
disposable 
income 
Fiscal  
redistribution 
From 
taxes 
From 
transfers 
From 
pensions 
From 
unempl. 
From 
other 
              
Australia 2003 0.461 0.312 32.3% 31% 69% 22% 5% 42% 
Austria 2004 0.459 0.269 41.5% 18% 82% 57% 5% 20% 
Belgium 2000 0.542 0.279 48.6% 24% 76% 58% 8% 10% 
Canada 2004 0.433 0.318 26.4% 32% 68% 33% 8% 27% 
Czech Republic 2004 0.468 0.267 42.9% 17% 83% 54% 2% 26% 
Denmark 2004 0.419 0.228 45.5% 21% 79% 33% 8% 39% 
Estonia 2004 0.493 0.340 31.0% 21% 79% 56% 1% 22% 
Finland 2004 0.464 0.252 45.7% 19% 81% 41% 6% 33% 
France 2005 0.449 0.281 37.4% 9% 91% 47% 9% 35% 
Germany 2004 0.489 0.278 43.0% 23% 77% 52% 5% 21% 
Greece 2004 0.462 0.329 28.8% 5% 95% 82% 3% 10% 
Hungary 2005 0.533 0.289 45.8% 0% 100% 62% 2% 36% 
Ireland 2004 0.490 0.312 36.4% 24% 76% 20% 4% 52% 
Israel 2005 0.491 0.370 24.6% 34% 66% 21% 3% 42% 
Italy 2004 0.503 0.338 32.7% 0% 100% 83% 2% 15% 
Korea 2006 0.334 0.311 6.8% 25% 75% 30% 0% 45% 
Luxembourg 2004 0.452 0.268 40.7% 19% 81% 53% 4% 23% 
Mexico 2004 0.476 0.458 3.8% 0% 100% 41% 0% 59% 
Netherlands 2004 0.459 0.263 42.7% 20% 80% 48% 5% 27% 
Norway 2004 0.430 0.256 40.5% 18% 82% 31% 4% 47% 
Poland 2004 0.527 0.320 39.2% 2% 98% 61% 3% 33% 
Slovak Rep 1996 0.425 0.241 43.4% 0% 100% 70% 8% 23% 
Slovenia 2004 0.416 0.242 41.8% 0% 100% 79% 3% 18% 
Spain 2004 0.441 0.315 28.5% 1% 99% 80% 8% 11% 
Sweden 2005 0.442 0.237 46.4% 16% 84% 38% 8% 39% 
Switzerland 2004 0.395 0.268 32.3% -2% 102% 79% 8% 16% 
UK 2004 0.490 0.345 29.7% 14% 86% 27% 0% 59% 
US 2004 0.482 0.372 22.7% 37% 63% 34% 2% 27% 
Mean LIS-28 0.462 0.299 35.3% 15% 85% 46% 5% 34% 
 
Source: LIS data based on Wang and Caminada (2011); data are available at  
http://www.lisdatacenter.org/resources/other-databases/ 
 
 
3  Private social expenditures 
 
The OECD defines social expenditures as ‘the provision by public and private institutions of 
benefits to, and financial contributions targeted at, households and individuals in order to 
provide support during circumstances which adversely affect their welfare, provided that the 
provision of the benefits and financial contributions constitutes neither a direct payment for a 
particular good or service nor an individual contract or transfer’ (Adema, Fron and Ladaigue, 
2011: 90). Since only benefits provided by institutions are included in the social expenditure 
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definition, transfers between households - albeit of a social nature - are not in the social 
domain. Social benefits include cash benefits (e.g. pensions, income support during 
maternity leave, and social assistance payments), social services (e.g. childcare, care for the 
elderly and disabled) and tax breaks with a social purpose (e.g. tax expenditures towards 
families with children, or favourable tax treatment of contributions to private health plans). 
There are two main criteria which have to be simultaneously satisfied for an expenditure item 
to be classified as social: 1) the benefits have to be intended to address one or more social 
purposes; and 2) programs regulating the provision of benefits have to involve either inter-
personal redistribution, or compulsory participation.  
The distinction between public and private social protection is made on the basis of whoever 
controls the relevant financial flows; public institutions or private bodies. 
Within the group of private social benefits, two broad categories can be distinguished: 
mandatory and voluntary private social expenditure. Mandatory private social expenditure is 
social support stipulated by legislation but operated through the private sector, e.g. direct 
sickness payments by employers to their absent employees as legislated by public authorities, 
or benefits accruing from mandatory contributions to private insurance funds. In some 
countries public disability benefits (and sometimes unemployment benefits) can be 
supplemented by private benefits with mandatory contributions, agreed upon in collective 
negotiations between employers and employees.  
Voluntary private social expenditure concerns benefits accruing from privately operated 
programs that involve the redistribution of resources across households and include benefits 
provided by NGOs, and benefit accruing from tax advantaged individual plans and collective 
(often employment-related) support arrangements, such as for example, pensions, and, in the 
US, employment-related health plans.  
Table 2 summarizes which expenditures are social and which are not. 
 
Table 2 Categorization of benefits with a social purpose a, b  
 
 Public Private 
 
 Mandatory  Voluntary  Mandatory  Voluntary  
 
Redistribution  
Means-tested 
benefits, social 
insurance benefits  
Voluntary 
participation in public 
insurance programs. 
Self-employed ‘opting 
in’ to obtain 
insurance coverage.  
Employer-provided 
sickness benefits, 
benefits accruing 
from mandatory 
contributions, to e.g. 
pension or disability 
insurance.  
Tax-advantaged 
benefits, e.g. 
individual retirement 
accounts, 
occupational 
pensions, employer-
provided health plans  
No redistribution  
Benefits from 
government 
managed individual 
saving schemes  
 
Non tax-advantaged 
actuarially fair 
pension benefits 
Exclusively private: 
Benefits accruing 
from insurance plans 
bought at market 
prices given 
individual 
preferences. 
 
Notes: 
a By definition transfers between individuals, even when of a social nature, are not considered to be 
within the social domain.  
b The shaded cells reflect benefits that are NOT classified as social. 
 
Source: Adema, Fron and Ladaique (2011: 94) 
 
 
 
Table 3 shows public and private social expenditure as a percentage of GDP, for the most 
recent data year 2007. Most social support is publicly provided. In most countries the share 
of public social benefits in total social expenditures exceeds 85 percent. However, the role of 
private arrangements of varying nature in providing close substitutes to public social 
protection expenditure is considerable in some OECD countries. In the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and Korea, the share of private social expenditure is more than 25 percent, while 
in the US this share is almost 40 percent. In most countries private voluntary expenditure 
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are dominant, but there are exceptions: mainly in Switzerland mandatory private 
expenditures are very high. Figure 3 shows that in a number of countries private social 
expenditures have risen quite rapidly over the years.  
There may be various explanations for this increase in private social expenditure in various 
countries. Lower public protection may induce private social arrangements of different 
nature. But a shift from public to private provision of social protection can also be an explicit 
policy objective, to alleviate public budgets, or to strengthen incentives in the system. For 
example, the privatisation of the sickness benefit program in the Netherlands was directed at 
increasing the incentives for employers to reduce the number of beneficiaries. Policy makers 
may also want to realize efficiency gains through a shift from public to private provision, 
because private providers have stronger incentives to reduce costs. Anyway, accounting for 
private social expenditures is important for judging the social effort and the level of social 
protection in countries.  
 
Table 3: Public and private social expenditure, % GDP, 2007 
 
  
Public 
expenditure 
 
(2) 
Private 
mandatory 
 
(3) 
Private 
 voluntary 
 
(4) 
Private 
expenditure 
 
(5)=(3)+(4) 
Total 
expenditure 
 
(6)=(2)+(5) 
Share 
private 
 
(5)/(6)*100 
Australia 16.0 0.5 3.3 3.8 19.8 19% 
Austria 26.4 0.8 1.0 1.8 28.2 6% 
Belgium 26.3 0.0 4.7 4.7 31.1 15% 
Canada 16.9 0.0 5.3 5.3 22.2 24% 
Czech Republic 18.8 0.2 0.2 0.4 19.2 2% 
Denmark 26.1 0.2 2.3 2.6 28.7 9% 
Estonia 13.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.0 0% 
Finland 24.8 0.0 1.1 1.1 25.9 4% 
France 28.4 0.4 2.6 2.9 31.3 9% 
Germany 25.2 1.1 1.8 2.9 28.0 10% 
Greece 21.3 0.0 1.5 1.5 22.9 7% 
Hungary 22.9 0.0 0.2 0.2 23.1 1% 
Ireland 16.3 0.0 1.5 1.5 17.8 8% 
Israel 15.5 0.0 0.5 0.5 16.0 3% 
Italy 24.9 1.6 0.6 2.1 27.0 8% 
Korea 7.6 0.6 2.0 2.6 10.2 26% 
Luxembourg 20.6 0.3 0.7 0.9 21.6 4% 
Mexico 7.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 7.4 3% 
Netherlands 20.1 0.6 6.3 6.9 27.0 26% 
Norway 20.8 1.2 0.8 2.0 22.8 9% 
Poland 19.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.8 0% 
Slovak Republic 15.7 0.1 0.8 1.0 16.7 6% 
Slovenia 20.3 0.0 1.0 1.0 21.3 5% 
Spain 21.6 0.0 0.5 0.5 22.1 2% 
Sweden 27.3 0.4 2.5 2.9 30.2 10% 
Switzerland 18.5 7.2 1.1 8.3 26.8 31% 
United Kingdom 20.5 0.8 5.0 5.8 26.3 22% 
United States 16.2 0.3 10.2 10.5 26.7 39% 
Mean OECD-28 20.0 0.6 2.1 2.6 22.6 12% 
 
Source: OECD (2012), Social Expenditure database 1980-2007 (www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure); 
download April 6th, 2012; and own calculations. 
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Figure 3: Change in public and private social expenditure 1980-2007, %-points of GDP 
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Note: Countries are ranked in order of their level of private social expenditure in 2007. Note that not all 
countries of Table 3 are plotted in Figure 3, because 1980-data is not available for all countries. 
 
Source: OECD (2012), Social Expenditure database 1980-2007 (www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure); 
download April 6th, 2012; and own calculations. 
 
 
But what about the redistributive impact of private social arrangements? It is plausible that 
the redistributive effects of transfers are weaker in countries where programs mostly rely on 
earnings-related schemes compared to countries with mostly (public) means-tested 
provisions of transfers. Private insurance schemes are actuarially fair as a rule. Most private 
insurances are not earnings-related. Individual private pension insurances, for example, have 
a defined contribution character, and therefore do not contain any elements of (ex ante) 
income redistribution. Private schemes can also have earnings-related benefits. It is 
sometimes argued that earnings-related social insurance benefits only reproduce inequalities 
in market income and therefore do not redistribute economic resources between income 
segments, in case benefits are perfectly earnings-related and the risk of being in receipt of 
benefit is equally distributed in the population. So, in that case a higher share of private 
social protection will not have any (partial) effect on the distribution of income. However, 
private earnings-related schemes may not be actuarially fair and may contain elements of 
solidarity. This is often the case when (supplementary) private schemes are negotiated by 
social partners in collective labour contracts. These schemes are mandatory for (a group of) 
workers. Defined benefit pension schemes, for example, generally redistribute resources 
both within generations (for instance through redistributive elements such as thresholds or 
ceilings) and across generations (risk sharing, back service). Defined benefit systems for 
early retirement tend to redistribute to members who leave before the official retirement age 
from those who stay. In fact, as we mentioned in the former section, private social programs 
by definition contain elements of interpersonal redistribution.  
Also, tax advantages (to households or to employers) can be used to stimulate the provision 
of private benefits. This is often the case in supplementary pension programs, where 
contributions are tax exempt. The fiscal advantages related to, for example, supplementary 
private pension plans are positively related to income levels in most countries. In general, as 
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Ferrarini and Nelson (2002: 14-15) showed, social insurance is less equalising after taxation 
in all countries.  
In general, we do expect that private schemes will generate less income redistribution than 
public programs, although at this stage the distributional impact of taking account for private 
social schemes in a cross-country analysis is not fully clear. Private arrangements will likely 
have less redistributional effects compared to public programs. In addition, it is plausible 
that mainly higher income groups will make use of private social schemes (Casey and 
Yamada, 2002). Considering also that private schemes often have favourable tax treatment 
(deductibility of contributions), which benefits the rich, it is possible that private social 
expenditure has a positive effect on income inequality. In other words, we expect income 
inequality to be relatively high (low) in countries where the share of private arrangement in the 
total social benefits is relatively high (low).  
 
 
4  The link between public/private social protection and income inequality 
 
We performed various cross-county analyses of the relationship between public and private 
social expenditures and the income distribution. Obviously, this analysis is not very 
sophisticated. The material presented here is only descriptive and does not explain the 
household income distribution. Such an analysis should ideally be based on a theory, which 
would have to address at least the following cross-national differences (cf. Gottschalk and 
Smeeding, 2000: 263): differences in labour markets that affect earnings of individual 
household members; difference in sources of capital and in returns to capital; demographic 
differences, such as the ageing of the population and growth of single parent households, which 
affect both family needs and labour market decisions; and differences across countries in tax 
and transfers policies that not only affect family income directly, but also may affect work and 
investment decisions. Such a comprehensive approach is far beyond the scope of this paper. 
In figure 4 (panel a), we have plotted the average level of public social expenditure as 
percentage of GDP and the average level of the Gini coefficient of disposable income for 
countries, where both data-items are available. Both averages are represented by the cross 
of both axes: 20.0 percent for public expenditures, and 0.301 for the Gini. Several countries 
show levels in social transfers above this average. Other countries combine a below-average 
level of public social expenditure with an above-average level in inequality.  
We find a pretty good fit of a logarithmic OLS-regression with the level of the Gini and the 
level of public social spending as a percentage of GDP (a similar regression is done by 
Gouyette and Pestieau, 1999); see table 4. Using public expenditure as dependent variable 
produces the expected negative sign, while the coefficient is statistically significant. In other 
words, we find a quite strong negative relationship between public social expenditures and 
income inequality. Obviously, public social security transfers are well-targeted towards the 
poor.  
The picture alters when we take private social security expenditures into account in our 
analysis; see figure 4 panel b. A statistically significant relationship between private social 
expenditures and inequality can not be found. This is confirmed by a simple logarithmic 
regression analysis reported in table 4. These are indications that support our hypothesis 
that private arrangements in social protection do not have the same distributional effects as 
public arrangements. But we do not find an opposite effect here. 
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 Figure 4: Public and private social expenditure and Gini index of equivalized disposable 
income 
 
Panel a
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
5 10 15 20 25 30
Public Social Expenditure
G
in
i 
D
is
po
sa
bl
e 
In
co
m
e
 
Panel b
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 3 6 9 12
Private Social Expenditure
G
in
i 
D
is
po
sa
bl
e 
In
co
m
e
 
 
 
Table 4: Impact of public and private social expenditure on income inequality around 2007 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Intercept 
Total 
expenditure 
Public 
expenditure 
Private 
expenditure Adj. R2 
Gini index 
disposable 
income 
        
(1) -0.195 -0.250***   0.215 (-1.68) (-2.90)     
(2) -0.157  -0.290***  0.300 (-1.49)  (-3.54)    
(3) -0.164  -0.284*** -0.005 0.274 (1.49)  (-3.29) (-0.29)   
(4) -0.526***   -0.021 -0.001 (-37.04)     (-0.99)   
 
Notes:  Logarithmic OLS-regression; t-statistics in parentheses.   
*** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at 0.05 level, * significant at 0.10 level 
 
Source: OECD (2012), LIS-data based on Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations 
 
 
Note that private arrangements mitigate the impact of public social effort on income 
inequality to some extent, although the estimated coefficient of the total expenditure-
variable is still negative and significant. In an earlier paper with less recent data we found 
that, as a result of the divergent effects of public social expenditure versus private social 
expenditure, the relationship between total social expenditures and income inequality across 16 
wealthy countries appeared to be statistically trivial (Caminada and Goudswaard, 2005).3 
 
We performed a similar analysis of the relationship between public and private social 
expenditures with the reduction in income inequality caused by income transfers (income 
redistribution from taxes and social benefits as defined in section 2). In figure 5 panel a the 
expected relationship is shown: countries with a higher level of public social expenditure have 
more income redistribution or more reduction of the Gini. Panel b shows that there is hardly 
any relationship between private social expenditures and income redistribution. This is partly 
confirmed by the regression results in table 5. We should notice, however, that in specification 
(3) the coefficient of the private expenditure variable is negative and statistically significant at 
0.10 level. So here we find an indication that private social arrangements indeed may have an 
impact on income redistribution that is opposite from the impact of public arrangements.    
                                                 
3 Moreover, we performed another analysis as well and we find similar results in case net rather than 
gross social expenditures are taken into our empirical analysis. However, data on net public and net 
private social expenditures are not (yet) available for Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Slovenia and 
Switzerland. 
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Figure 5: Public and private social expenditure and the redistribution of income 
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Table 5: Impact of public and private social expenditure on income redistribution around 
2007 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Intercept 
Total 
expenditure 
Public 
expenditure 
Private 
expenditure adj. R2 
Redistribution:  
(Ginipre – Ginipost)  
        
(1) -2.674*** 1.378***   0.583 (-8.99) (6.22)     
(2) -2.809***  1.542***  0.730 (-12.18)  (8.61)    
(3) -2.914***  1.630*** -0.075* 0.758 (-12.96)  (9.29) (-1.99)   
(4) -0.837***   0.014 -0.037 (-16.43)     (0.18)   
 
Notes:  Logarithmic OLS-regression; t-statistics in parentheses.   
*** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at 0.05 level, * significant at 0.10 level 
- Gini index of market (pre-government private sector) income: Ginipre 
- Gini index net disposable (post-government) income: Ginipost 
 
Source: OECD (2012), LIS-data based on Wang and Caminada (2011), and own calculations 
 
 
5  Conclusions 
 
Most analyses of social protection are focussed on public arrangements. But social effort is 
not restricted to the public domain; all kinds of private arrangements can be close 
substitutes to public programs. In fact, OECD-data indicate that in several countries there 
has been a shift from public towards private social arrangements. Private arrangements are 
considered as ‘social’ when they serve a social purpose and when there is some kind of 
government involvement. Examples are supplementary employment-based and tax 
advantaged pension plans and private health insurance plans with legal stipulations. In this 
contribution we analysed the distributional effects of public and private social arrangements. 
Income redistribution is one of the important objectives of the welfare state. In all OECD 
countries, the social protection system causes a more equal distribution of incomes. Taxes 
and transfers reduce the Gini coefficient by roughly 20 to 50 percent in OECD countries. 
Public pensions have the strongest redistributive impact. Based on cross-country 
regressions, we find a negative relationship between public social expenditures and income 
inequality.  
However, we expect that private schemes will generate less redistribution from rich to poor. 
And indeed, we do not find a statistically significant relationship between private social 
expenditures and income inequality and income redistribution. Consequently, changes in the 
public/private mix in the provision of social protection may affect the redistributive impact of 
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the welfare state. Accounting for private social arrangements matters as far as the 
distributional impact of the social protection system is concerned. 
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